Biased Coin (Haghani & Dewey, 2016)

A recent paper by Haghani & Dewey (2016) sheds an unflattering light on subjects formally trained in finance as to their lack of basic knowledge with respect to probability and uncertainty – “If a high fraction of quantitatively sophisticated, financially trained individuals have so much difficulty in playing a simple game with a biased coin, what should we expect when it comes to the more complex and long-term task of investing one’s savings?” Though an otherwise interesting study, there are a couple of key points which do not receive adequate attention in the paper:

• Financial: Though the median final bankroll of $10,504 is derived in the footnotes, there is not sufficient attention drawn to it in the paper itself. Time-Value automatically generates this value whereas Expected-Value generates the wholly unrealistic $3,220,637.
• Psychological: The fallacy of “Playing With House Money” – “…you are offered a stake of $25 to take out your laptop to bet on the flip of a coin for thirty minutes.” What would have happened if the subjects had to pay $25 to play instead of being given it for free? 

No less a luminary in both the financial and gambling worlds than Ed Thorp says: “This is a great experiment for many reasons. It ought to become part of the basic education of anyone interested in finance or gambling.”

Evens-Equivalent Trades

Risk of Ruin (RoR) (Epstein 2009) provides an easily understood metric (probability of bankroll depletion before doubling it) with which to compare strategies. By way of illustration, let us assume that both you and your brother are recreational handicappers. You trade baseball, home-underdogs and he trades horse-racing, second-favorites, as follows:

Sport	Bank	Trades	Avg. Odds	Avg. Win Rate	Avg. Stake	Evens Odds	Evens Win Rate	Evens Stake	Expect. Value	Std. Dev.	EV.SD	Edge	Rsk Of Ruin
MLB	5,000	500	2.10	51.00%	250.00	2.00	53.37%	263.05	17.75	262.45	219	7.10%	7.11%
H-R	2,500	1,000	3.50	31.00%	100.00	2.00	52.62%	162.10	8.50	161.87	363	8.50%	16.53%

In the classic treatment of ruin, there is a working assumption of even-money trades to make the calculations tractable. To that end, we must first transform our real-world trades into their even-money equivalents with the same edge and volatility, see Krigman (1999). Despite having a smaller edge and a larger stake, you have a lower probability of depletion than your brother principally because you are risking a lower percentage of your bankroll per trade. Ideally, your RoR should be below 5% and to achieve this you both would have to either increase your bankroll or decrease your stake, as follows. [(MLB: 5%, 218.20 or 5730); (H-R: 5%, 54.97 or 4,546)].



Note that Edge's impact only equates with that of Volatility after 219 trades for you and 363 trades for your brother. And it takes a minimum of 806 trades for you and 1336 trades for your brother before you can be at least 95% confident that the combined effects of positive edge and mixed-bag volatility work in your favor to guarantee positive bankroll growth. In other words, despite having potentially successful trading strategies, you both will be well into your second season of handicapping before you can be sure of beginning to reap the benefits!

Juvenile Finish Position Ratings

In horse-racing, 2yos are by definition the least exposed runners at the racetrack. In the context of handicapping 2yo races, we can create a simple model to generate race-specific ratings based solely on finishing positions and number of runners per race in each horse's past performances record. These ratings will guide our elimination process. Remember that, in handicapping, elimination of probable non-contenders is always preferred to the selection of possible contenders.

• First, calculate "horses beaten" (n-f) and "horses beaten by" (f-1) from finishing positions (f) and number of runners (n) for each race in a horse's past performances. 
• Then, sum across all races for wins (w=Σ(n-f)) and losses (l=Σ(f-1)) respectively.
• Next, calculate a horse's posterior probability m=(w+α)/((w+α)+(l+β)). Prior wins (α) and losses (β) are derived from two full seasons of 2yo races and are equivalent to a horse finishing fourth of seven runners in a virtual race. Note that a first-time starter would automatically have a posterior probability of 0.50=(0+3)/((0+3)+(0+3)). 
• Finally, convert probabilities to performance ratings (min:112=8-00, max:126=9-00) using the following formula: r=((a+(b-a))*((m-x)/(y-x))), where a=out.min, b=out.max, x=in.min, and y=in.max of all runners in the current race.

The final rank ordering of horses is important, not the absolute performance ratings.
In summary, this finishing position rating system (fpr) does not take into account the strength of opposition, beaten lengths, weight carried, or finishing times; however, when it is based on a whole season of results, the fpr ranks correlate approximately 0.87 with the equivalent ranks from an Elo rating system.

As luck would have it, Sunday's Prix Marcel Boussac (Fillies' Group 1) - France's top 2yo fillies race - had a 0.92 correlation between fpr ranks and finishing positions, with the 10/1 winner (Wuheida) top-rated! Not scientific, nevertheless I get to keep the winnings.

Speed-Stamina Fingerprints

In 1981, Peter Riegel formulated an equation for the relationship between distance and time of athletics world-records. In 1982, Steve Roman adapted Riegel's equation to try and resolve the Secretariat Preakness controversy.
In a similar vein, we can generate unique speed-stamina, power-law fingerprints for racecourses (and horses) based on the best times for various distances. The simplest interpretation of these racecourse fingerprints is to confirm our expectations of the demands imposed by similar distances for different course configurations (Epsom is faster than either Ascot or Newmarket (lower y-intercept); Ascot and Newmarket have similar stamina profiles (same slopes)). Another possible insight might be how these course fingerprints reflect the potential impact on horses with different pace profiles (early speed at Epsom). A further analysis might be on how to better baseline and equate speed figures at different racecourses (use standard course with own speed-stamina equation). Finally, more controversially, using speed-stamina fingerprints for classic-generation (3yos) horses to match with course fingerprints in the lead-up to Group 1 contests (Epsom Derby) or for comparing performances from different classic generations (Frankel vs Sea The Stars).

Note the graph only shows best times and power-law equations for five, six, and seven-furlong races at Ascot, Epsom, and Newmarket and are for illustrative purposes only.

Wisdom Of Crowd Market Index (WCMI)

In sports markets, the probabilities implied by the prices on offer are a proxy for the wisdom of the crowd for that particular event. By adapting Shannon's Entropy formula, we can generate our own "Wisdom Of Crowd Market Index" (WCMI) to represent this information on a scale from 0 - 1.

      First, calculate implied probabilities of prices: x = 1.00 / d 
      (where d = decimal odds).
      Next, calculate log probabilities: y = log(x, n)
      (where n = number of entrants).
      Then, multiply probabilities by log probabilities: z = x * y.
      Finally, sum products and subtract from one for final index:
      wcmi = 1 - (-sum(z)).      
    

Note that the index is at a minimum (0.00) when the market is completely uninformed about the outcome (all prices are the same) and at a maximum (1.00) when the market has closed (no price for winner and maximum price for all others). In the realistic exchange market above (snapshot of prices taken one minute before going in-play), the crowd is relatively uninformed (0.03) about the likely outcome and presents an excellent opportunity for the informed sports trader. Personally, I do not trade in any market with an index above 0.13 (approx).

It is very gratifying to note that FlatStats are now (29-Dec-2017) using our WCMI as a guide to those markets in which the crowd is less well-informed!